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Abstract
Since 2015, certain taxpayers may apply for the special status in order to promote 
voluntary compliance at the Tax Authority of Republic of Slovenia (FURS), after 
the horizontal monitoring pilot project was successfully finished in 2010. The the-
oretical background of the status is based on the idea of  co-operative compliance, 
which can be described as the monitoring, predicting and preventing problems 
in the tax authority and taxpayers relationship. The purpose of the section is to 
analyse the instrument, which should establish cooperation based on transpa-
rency, understanding and mutual trust between taxpayers and tax authority. The 
research methodology was focused on survey among tax experts participated in 
drafting the legislation implementing cooperative relationship as well as experts 
empowered for monitoring the institute. The main objectives of the study have 
focused on the current activities identification, the assessment of expectations, 
the gaps, constraints and potential changes of the instrument identification and 
the evaluation of the long-term effects of the institute.




Tax compliance is crucial for every country, since it is the basic prerequisite for 
its existence. As a result, the national authorities in charge of collecting tax reve-
nues are forced to manage tax risks, which is a multi-dimensioned activity. These 
risks primarily stem from the legal environment created by laws, international 
agreements, and the interpretation of both. As opposed to societies 300 years ago 
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that were focused entirely on legality, the legal environment of today strives for 
a lawful and legitimate authority which in the broadest sense is called good pub-
lic governance or good administration. It is a more partnership-like, preventive, 
open, co-operative, responsible, and decentralised public administration, which, 
however, still strives for the efficiency of authority and society as a whole by 
virtue of the parallel corrective measures of coercion and coordination (Kovač 
et al., 2016, p. 20). As regards the attitude of taxpayers to tax compliance, or 
their conduct in the matter, there have lately been appearing serious doubts in 
the prevailing economic view that trust is good and control is even better. This 
long-standing prevailing view argued that deterrence from unlawful conduct is 
possible through rigid controls or investigations and harsh penalties. However, it 
has been shown that strict controls and penalties can also have unintended side 
effects, which is why psychological variables (e.g. attitude to taxation, social 
norms, the perception of fairness, etc.) are increasingly taken into account. Social 
control in general and especially investigations as key activities of a regulated 
society follow the realisation that people observe legal order primarily because 
it represents the legitimate structure of a regulated society and not out of fear of 
sanctions and penalties (May and Wood, 2003, p. 117).
On the basis of the above scientific findings, numerous countries have begun 
introducing “alternative” approaches in the relationship with taxpayers. In addi-
tion to the traditional authority - taxpayer relationship founded on hierarchy, we 
are increasingly seeing co-operative compliance, which can be described as the 
monitoring, forecasting, and prevention of problems that appear in the relation-
ship between taxpayers and the tax authority. At the same time, the “enhanced 
relationship” concept began appearing at the level of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and has so far been introduced in 
several countries while in many more it is still in the development phase.
The aim of the paper is to provide an in-depth analysis of the special status grant-
ed for the promotion of voluntary tax compliance, an instrument available to 
medium-sized and large taxpayers. The Republic of Slovenia enacted it in the 
autumn of 2015. The main goal of the analysis is to assess the fulfilment of tax 
authority’s expectations when implementing modern tax instrument of voluntary 
tax compliance. While policy instruments are carriers of causal ideas and eco-
nomic theories used and adopted by the legislators. Accordingly, effective pol-
icy-making and thus tax regulation necessitates effective mechanisms that can 
facilitate preliminary impact assessment of planned tax instruments. FURS as 
the leading organization in the legislation preparation and implementation phases 
has detected numerous positive effects (in particular, encouraging taxpayers to 
calculate and pay taxes properly and on time, better utilisation of the authority’s 
available human, financial, and material resources) of the observed instrument, 
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although no measurable targets or performance criteria of the institute have been 
set. This fact complicates our research results and their interpretation.
The study was conducted using the methodology of surveying FURS experts who 
participated in the drafting of legislative bases and those who monitor and imple-
ment this institute so as to investigate the current activities of FURS in this field, 
how the expectations prior to the introduction have been met, what shortcomings, 
restrictions, or amendments to the present arrangement are necessary and how the 
long-term effects of this institute have been evaluated.
The paper consists of six sections. The first focuses on the placement of the con-
tent in a broader theoretical framework, the second presents the Slovenian model 
of a co-operative relationship between FURS and taxpayers, while the third pre-
sents the results of the analysis conducted among FURS experts. In addition to 
the conclusions, the fourth section describes the basic starting points for further 
research and views on the Slovenian model.
2. MODERN APPROACHES TO TAX COMPLIANCE FROM 
THE AUTHORITY’S PERSPECTIVE 
Tax compliance represents the extent to which taxpayers comply with tax law. On 
the other hand, tax non-compliance is defined as the concept of a “tax gap”, whi-
ch represents the difference between actually collected tax revenues and potential 
tax revenues (James & Nobes, 2000). A widespread view among tax scholars re-
veals that the law enforcement is not the reason for paying taxes, while the penal-
ty for ordinary tax convictions is small and the probability of detection is trivial 
(Andreoni et al., 1998). While compliance and non-compliance is not black and 
white issue, there are several factors influencing the intensity of compliance, like 
the degree of tax burden, the purpose of expenditures funded by collected reve-
nues, the form of taxation, the public perception on whether the tax system is fair 
or not, etc. (Popović, 1997). Numerous studies, economic, legal and psychologi-
cal, discuss factors that influence the fulfilment of tax liabilities (Posner, 2000, 
Kirchler et al., 2008, Kirchler et al., Torgler, 2003, 2014, Dimitrijević, 2016). The 
essay of Posner (2000) focuses on law and social norms of tax compliance, emp-
hasising the aspect of social norms in the society. Kirchler et al., 2008 focused 
on power of tax authorities and trust in the tax authorities as relevant dimensions 
for understanding tax compliance. Using the framework as an operational tool, 
the study has discussed several factors (like fines, audit probabilities, tax rate, 
knowledge, attitudes, norms and fairness) to find approaches to increase tax com-
pliance. The authors’ research has been upgraded by the so-called ‘slippery slope’ 
framework as a new approach to understand tax compliance. The slippery slope 
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approach supposes two routes to tax compliance: deterrence of tax evasion by au-
dits and fines on the one hand, and building a trusting relationship with taxpayers 
by services and support on the other hand (Kirchler et al., 2014).
Nowadays tax-related literature emphasizes the meaning of the understanding 
and cooperation between tax authority and taxpayers in the application of tax 
legislation. The standpoint of this authority-taxpayers relation is the principle of 
reciprocity. Positive reciprocity results in the positive attitude of tax authorities 
towards taxpayers and consequently provides better conditions for voluntary tax 
compliance. The negative reciprocity may cause legal tax avoidance and tax eva-
sion (Torgler, 2003). Dimitrijević, 2016 develops last 30-years lasting tax litera-
ture trend of shaping taxpayers’ behaviour starting with self-assessment concept1 
and spreading it to voluntary tax compliance and cooperative tax compliance as 
the highest level of this relationship. Generally, economic studies emphasise the 
so-called external factors, such as non-compliance costs, the likelihood of tax 
investigation, the amount of the tax base and the tax rate, and penalties, while 
psychological studies point out the so-called internal factors such as knowledge 
of tax legislation, the attitude of taxpayers to government and taxation, personal 
norms, accepted social norms and fairness, tax morality, tax climate, etc. (Hof-
man et al., 2008). 
According to Kirchler et al., 2008, the position the authorities adopt towards 
taxpayers is important for compliance. The overall tax climate in society can 
range between antagonistic and synergistic. In an antagonistic climate, taxpayers 
work against the tax authority and perceive each other as cops and robbers. The 
tax authority perceives taxpayers as robbers who will avoid payment whenever 
possible, which is why control is indispensable, while taxpayers feel persecuted 
and find it acceptable to evade taxes. In a synergistic relationship, however, they 
work together. The latter is best described using the “service-client relationship” 
as promoted by the idea of New Public Management. Authorities strive for tran-
sparent procedures and respectful and supportive treatment of taxpayers. Such a 
relationship in society will lead to the voluntary fulfilment of tax liabilities and 
individuals will be less prone to avoidance and more willing to share the tax bur-
den of society (Kirchler et al., 2008, Braithwaite, 2003).
By far the most prominent model that has combined the economic and psycho-
logical knowledge of taxpayers’ behaviour is the so-called slippery-slope fra-
mework. The latter showed that the power of the tax authority and trust in the 
authority by taxpayers are the two most important factors affecting tax complian-
ce. It was precisely this scientific conclusion that influenced the practices of tax 
1  The self-assessment concept focuses on the specific trust places by tax authorities in certain 
categories of taxpayers.
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authorities in managing the behaviour of taxpayers and the practice of inspection. 
It turned out that repressive authorities have to promote co-operative compliance 
far more than relying solely on the deterrent effect of inspections and fines. In the 
vast majority of cases, partnership-like and preventive assurance of compliance 
with regulations is more effective among taxpayers (Kirchler et al., 2014, Kovač 
& Gajduschek, 2015).
The main purpose of improving relations between taxpayers and tax authorities is 
to increase transparency and co-operation between taxpayers and the tax authori-
ty so as to resolve any tax issues in a timely manner. Inclusion in these program-
mes is typically encouraged by the tax authority, which primarily monitors the 
scope and quality of the taxpayer’s internal tax controls during the inclusion whi-
le taking into account tax risks. With their entry into the programme, the taxpayer 
is expected to reveal the uncertainty of their tax position to the tax authority in 
return for a timely resolution of any related issues. The concept of “uncertainty of 
the tax position” represents all the business activities the taxpayer is involved in 
and for which the taxpayer in a tax procedure seeks to obtain any tax advantages 
that are not substantiated by a formal tax audit, whereby these tax advantages 
include anything that reduces the payment of tax. An uncertain tax position can 
arise from the openness or ambiguity of tax legislation relating to such a position 
of the taxpayer, especially in terms of the established tax facts, though it may also 
refer to confusion in calculating the tax base arising from such circumstances 
affecting the taxpayer. Specifically, it is considered that the tax authority will in 
this case only audit the submitted tax returns and self-assessment tax returns in 
order to check any materially undisclosed issues, but not the previously mentio-
ned uncertain tax positions (Simone et al., 2013).
The OECD (2008) identifies three basic mechanisms for improving relations 
between the tax authority and taxpayers: (1) a unilateral statement by the tax 
authority setting out the process of improving relations and the consequences if 
the taxpayer or tax representative agrees to co-operate or not to co-operate; (2) 
a document signed by the tax authority, taxpayer and tax representative, which 
determines how they intend to work together and what they intend to do, and with 
particular focus on the consequences arising if they fail to do so; (3) an agreement 
between the tax authority and specific taxpayers created to meet specific needs.
In practice, what has become the most prominent is “horizontal monitoring”, the 
model or method where tax authorities and taxpayers sign an agreement. Among 
the first to adopt this co-operative method was the Dutch administration (tax and 
customs), with France, South Korea, Australia, and Slovenia setting up a very 
similar model, which is further discussed below. A somewhat different approach 
was taken by the United Kingdom and Ireland, as it is not based on the signing of 
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formal agreements, but rather on the rules of corporate tax compliance for stable 
taxpayers (Sertić, 2012, Čičin-Šain, 2016).
3. DEVELOPING A PARTNERSHIP APPROACH IN THE 
TAXPAYER - TAX AUTHORITY RELATIONSHIP IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA
In the Republic of Slovenia, the first activities related to the concept of improved 
relations began in 2010 under the name horizontal monitoring. This is an example 
of the concept from the third group of the previously mentioned OECD classi-
fication and was established in accordance with the 2010–2013 DURS Business 
Strategy. The Strategy stipulated that the first strategic objective of the then Tax 
Administration of the Republic of Slovenia (DURS) was to increase voluntary 
tax compliance. The authority was supposed to achieve this by (Šinkovec, 2012):
• simplifying procedures for taxpayers who want to voluntarily fulfil tax 
liabilities,
• providing assistance to taxpayers who want to fulfil obligations but are not 
always able to,
• preventing taxpayers prone to tax avoidance or even evasion from such beha-
viour by quickly and effectively recognising any such cases,
• applying all enforcement measures provided for by law to those taxpayers 
who intentionally do not fulfil their tax liabilities.
DURS invited all major companies to participate (721 at the time) and 18 of them 
did. It was a pioneering attempt at establishing improved, partnership relations 
between DURS and taxpayers where control was carried out for the current and 
future activities of taxpayers, but not retroactively, as both sides were used to. 
The two-year project was followed by a result analysis phase in which interviews 
with taxpayers were conducted along with a survey among employees. Since 
both sides evaluated the project positively, the decision was made to continue 
development of the concept of voluntary compliance or partnership co-operation 
(Verbič et al., 2014).
The Financial Administration Act (ZFU) adopted at the transformation of DURS 
into FURS legalised, among other things, the granting of a special status to per-
sons liable for tax in terms of promoting voluntary compliance. It is apparent 
from the provision of the law that the intention of the authority or the legislator 
was to establish co-operation for the voluntary fulfilment of tax liabilities and the 
reduction of the administrative burden of tax control. Taxpayers who wanted or 
want to obtain this status must meet the following conditions:
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 ♦ in the last three years preceding the submission of the application, they 
obtained unqualified opinions from the auditor who audited the statements 
in accordance with the Companies Act;
 ♦ they have established internal tax controls or, at the time of signing the 
agreement, they undertake to establish them within the time limit set by 
FURS which is not longer than two years from the acquisition of the status;
 ♦ the taxpayer’s management can issue a statement obliging the taxpayer to 
inform FURS about any circumstances of their business that give (or could 
give) rise to tax risk, and to provide access to all information related to 
internal tax controls and take into account all FURS findings and recom-
mendations regarding the adequacy of internal tax controls established;
 ♦ the members of the taxpayer’s management have not been convicted of a 
criminal offence by a final decision or an offence concerning regulations 
on compulsory charges in the period of three years prior to the submission 
of the application for the special status; 
 ♦ based on data provided by FURS, it is reasonable to expect that they will 
fulfil their commitments under the special status for a period of three years 
prior to the submission of the application for the special status;
 ♦ at least three years have elapsed from the time the taxpayer actually started 
doing business to the time they submitted the application for the special 
status, whereby the legal predecessor’s period of business is taken into 
account in cases where the person liable for tax was created through a 
change of status.
The purpose of introducing this institute (Article 99 of ZFU) was to establish 
co-operation with taxpayers based on transparency, understanding and mutual 
trust between taxpayers and authorities. As a result of this improved co-operation, 
the promotion of voluntary compliance, and the reduction of administrative bur-
dens of financial control were expected. The conditions stipulate that taxpayers 
included in the programme must have internal tax controls, or have to introduce 
them as soon as possible (two years maximum), thus transferring certain con-
trol functions to the taxpayers themselves. However, this does not mean that the 
taxpayer cannot be subject to a subsequent investigation. 
4. CASE STUDY OF THE STATUS FOR THE PROMOTION OF 
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE
On the basis of the presented, the main objectives of our study were focusing on 
FURS’ current activities in this field, assessing the fulfilled expectations, identi-
fying possible shortcomings, limits and changes of the current arrangement and 
Tatjana Jovanović
160
evaluating the potential long-term effects of the introduction of this institute. The 
study was undertaken using a survey. The selection of the methodology was adap-
ted to the particularities of the research topic as well as to the special features of 
FURS as an authority. The individual perception and attitudes as well as organisa-
tional policies and practice can be assessed by the survey questionnaires (Baruch 
and Holtom, 2008). There are three major characteristics of research-oriented 
surveys, which differentiate them from according surveys as marketing tool or 
political polls. The purpose as first characteristic of the research-oriented surveys 
is to produce quantitative descriptions of some aspects of the study population, 
where the subject might be individuals, groups, organisations, but also projects, 
applications, etc. Secondly, the structured and predefined questions are a basic 
way of collecting information, while their answers constitute the data to be analy-
sed. Finally, data is generally collected on the sample of study population in a way 
to be able to generalise the findings to the population (Pinsonneault and Kraemer, 
1993). But, our research has taken into consideration the whole population inste-
ad of the sample due to population size. The study was based on a survey carried 
out among FURS experts who are involved in the instrument of the status for the 
promotion of voluntary compliance, or were involved in it when the legislation 
was being adopted at the end of 2016. Considering the fact that this is a relative-
ly new tax institute, we have abandoned the idea of using quantitative research 
method (interview). After contacting the tax authority’s general management, the 
methodology tools had to be changed. While the interviewing process has not 
been acceptable for the authority, the survey methodology has been agreed. The 
survey included 9 open-ended questions (without offering answers). Due to the 
lack of knowledge of the internal organisational structure and the responsibilities 
and knowledge of individual experts at FURS, we left the choice of respondents 
to the authority’s management. Initially, we submitted to FURS a survey asking 
for a minimum of fifteen experts to answer it. After examining the questions, the 
authority replied to the effect that it can provide only a joint or a uniform answer 
on three of the questions, while the remaining six questions can be answered by 
a significantly smaller number of respondents than requested. We received the 
answers of nine experts with the explanation that this is a very specific topic and 
very small number of employees has any knowledge about it. From the above it 
follows that prior to carrying out the survey, the final version of the questionnaire 
was harmonised with FURS. The survey we sent initially was subsequently adap-
ted to include “general questions for FURS” and a “questionnaire for individual 
employees”. The results of the survey were then analysed in line with the in-
structions for analysing open-ended questionnaires or structured interviews. The 
responses of individuals were summarised and presented in Table 1. In addition 
to the repeated answers that are covered in Table 1, we have presented below 
those answers that stand out, especially in terms of suggestions, explanations and 
comments from which we found out even more than we had initially planned.
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Table1: Results of the survey among FURS experts 
Question Summary of answers
In October 2015, the instrument of the “status 
for the promotion of voluntary compliance” 
was introduced into Slovenian tax legislation. 
In your opinion, what were the main purposes 
(e.g. improved co-operation with FURS, greater 
business transparency, etc.) and objectives (e.g. 
expected amount of collected taxes) for the in-
troduction of this instrument?
promoting the voluntary fulfilment of tax liabi-
lities 
partnership (transparent business in relation to 
FURS and open co-operation)
higher tax revenues
reducing the administrative burdens of FURS in 
relation to ex-post financial controls
eliminating the tax risks of financial control
How would you evaluate the usefulness of the 
pilot approach in introducing legal amendments 
in the field of taxation of legal persons in light 
of the experience gained from the introducti-
on of the horizontal monitoring instrument, in 
particular in terms of planning, implementation 
and the subsequent analysis of the pilot results?
good basis for gaining experience
good basis for recording legal matter
very sensible and mutually applicable approach
very useful
How do you assess co-operation with compa-
nies – both during the pilot project and at the 
present?
good, professional on both sides, in line with 
expectations
Do you think that the introduced instrument ful-
fils expectations and to what extent does it con-
tribute to more effective control and increased 
voluntary tax compliance?
giving an assessment of the institute is difficult 
due to the short time it has been in force
higher expectations regarding the number of 
taxpayers
improved control
How do you assess the suitability of the instru-
ment (the status for the promotion of voluntary 
compliance) in light of the experience so far, in 
particular in terms of any shortcomings, restri-
ctions and necessary changes to how this field is 
currently regulated?  
there is no need to change the legislation
Do you think that the inclusion of companies 
in this instrument (the status for the promotion 
of voluntary compliance) has contributed to 
improving their internal tax controls and more 
transparent co-operation with FURS in the sen-
se of providing information about any events 
from which a company’s tax liabilities could 
arise?
yes, more or less
Source: own, 2016
FURS experts also provided some additional explanations that proved very use-
ful for the study. On the subject of taxpayers, they explained that the pilot hori-
zontal monitoring project included 1% of all taxpayers (large), who were paying 
between 50% and 60% of all taxes collected. With this, they wanted to stress the 
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significance of the project and the subsequent enactment of the institute, poin-
ting out that the institute is intended for taxpayers who wish to voluntarily fulfil 
their tax liabilities, which gives FURS the chance to spend its remaining resour-
ces more efficiently on those who do not wish to. The pilot project involved 18 
taxpayers, with only 5 of them receiving the status under Article 99 of ZFU, while 
one application is currently in consideration. According to the experts, this dis-
parity is the result of the fact that the pilot project was joined by many taxpayers 
who primarily expected advantages, in terms of a lower probability of ex-post 
controls or tax investigations and a resolution of tax uncertainty, while they them-
selves were not prepared to make any major changes. In the pilot project, the 
establishment of internal tax controls was not a prerequisite for participation, 
but they do need to be established for the acquisition of the status no later than 
within two years after the status is acquired. The respondents think that taxpayers 
with the status know that the latter means a great deal of additional work due to 
the establishment of internal tax controls and also believe that they operate in a 
transparent manner, are prepared to co-operate, view the examination of inter-
nal tax controls positively, take recommendations into account and implement 
them within the agreed time frames. The experts estimate that the inclusion of 
companies in the institute, i.e. the acquisition of the status, has contributed to the 
improvement of the internal tax controls of taxpayers, although it must be noted 
that the companies involved are exclusively the taxpayers of the Special Finance 
Office, which means that they were treated as “special taxpayers” in terms of the 
exchange of information relevant for taxation even before obtaining the status.
Furthermore, the experts emphasise that, in line with expectations, FURS began 
operating more in the sense of establishing partnerships with taxpayers (timely 
provision of information, explanations, personal contact with taxpayers, open 
communications, etc.) and less as a supervisory authority.
This pioneering attempt at a pilot approach to the introduction of an instrument 
that was launched by the then Tax Administration of the Republic of Slovenia 
(DURS), now known as FURS, was assessed by the experts as good and very 
useful since certain experience was gained, but the establishment of minimum 
tax standards (the requirement to establish a system of internal tax controls and 
the development of an appropriate methodology for verifying their functioning) 
as the objective of the pilot project was not achieved because the authority is 
understaffed.
The suitability of the instrument of the status for the promotion of voluntary 
compliance was assessed by the experts as appropriate, since ongoing control of 
taxpayers and their internal tax controls is indeed carried out, which is why there 
is no need for subsequent investigations, although they are legally possible. They 
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did point out, however, that expectations regarding the number of taxpayers who 
would submit an application were higher, and that even with the current number 
of taxpayers involved the contact persons employed at FURS had to demonstrate 
significant commitment. Nevertheless, they highlighted two concrete proposals 
for improvement, specifically changing the conditions for gaining the status and 
changing the self-evaluation questionnaire on internal tax controls currently in 
use. In addition, the experts stress the role or importance of taxpayers’ internal 
audit services which could carry out some of the tasks that are otherwise perfor-
med in the context of the special status, and the importance of proper insurance 
for liabilities, given the fact that even taxpayers with the status may be subject to 
subsequent investigations.
The second part of the study (“general questions for FURS”) included the 
following questions:
1. Before deciding to introduce this instrument, did FURS or the Ministry of 
Finance conduct an analysis of the potential tax advantages for the coun-
try, taking into account the tax gap (the difference between the actual and 
the paid tax liabilities), which could be achieved by the introduction of this 
instrument?
2. Was there an evaluation of other potential long-term effects of the introdu-
ction of this instrument – organisational, staffing and other changes at FURS 
prior to the decision to introduce the horizontal monitoring instrument?
3. What activities is FURS currently performing in this field?
From the extensive answers of FURS, which mainly summarised the explanati-
ons of the institute published on FURS website and in the Proposal for the Finan-
cial Administration Act, we managed to determine the essence of the answers to 
our questions. As regards analysing the potential tax advantages for the country, 
the authority explained that although it would be possible to assess the indirect 
impact of co-operative compliance on reducing the tax gap, this would require 
financial and human resources and various external experts (behavioural econo-
mists, statisticians, etc.), which FURS does not have. Despite this and given the 
fact that the introduction of the institute in the Slovenian tax environment began 
at the end of 2015, FURS is planning to gather data and information to serve as 
the foundation in designing criteria and indicators to assess the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the activity with which the tax administration wants to improve 
the tax compliance of major companies and thereby protect society and financial 
interests (which is FURS’ second strategic objective) by having more resources 
to spend on taxpayers who are not prepared to meet their obligations voluntarily. 
Data that it collects or intends to collect includes:
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• the number of applications for the special status and the number of statuses 
granted to taxpayers,
• assessment of the reliability of internal tax controls – the number and the 
types of identified shortcomings of internal tax controls, 
• the number of recommendations issued,
• taxpayer satisfaction assessment – establishing trust in FURS (presumably 
once a year, at work meetings or using a questionnaire),
• the number of disputes (complaints processed) with taxpayers who were 
granted status compared to all large taxpayers,
• the number of work meetings, the number of disclosures of uncertain tax 
situations and the number of undisclosed situations identified during ex-post 
control,
• the number of explanations issued and the amount of binding information 
issued,
• the number and amounts of voluntary disclosures compared to the number 
and amounts of voluntary disclosures of all large taxpayers.
In regard to the second question (other potential long-term effects of the intro-
duction of this instrument – organisational, staffing and other changes at FURS), 
FURS replied that the horizontal monitoring project was launched in 2010 and 
included 18 large companies. With this pilot project, FURS wanted to answer the 
question of whether it is appropriate in the Slovenian tax environment to establish 
such a system of monitoring of all taxpayers who wish to fulfil voluntarily their 
tax liabilities and are willing to disclose their risks and establish effective internal 
control systems for tax purposes. After a two-year co-operation with taxpayers, 
an analysis or assessment of the project’s performance was carried out, which 
showed that the project was assessed positively2, and the decision was made to 
extend the pilot project, to solve the open issues in the meantime and to lay the 
groundwork for the inclusion of such forms of co-operation in legislation. In 
addition to assessing the satisfaction of taxpayers and employees with the pilot 
project of horizontal monitoring, FURS in February 2015 also carried out a sur-
vey among large companies to determine their familiarity with the possibility 
of being granted the special status and to measure their interest in submitting an 
application. Of the 61 submitted, FURS received 15 completed questionnaires, 
with 8 respondents answering that they are familiar with the development of the 
horizontal monitoring pilot project, 9 that they are familiar with Article 99 of 
ZFU, 8 said they are aware of the important advantages of the special status, and 
11 were prepared to submit the application for the special status, though 3 of them 
would need additional information.
2  A survey was carried out among the employees who participated in the project, as well as 
among taxpayers (separately in the banking sector and in other companies). 
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Regarding the third question (FURS’ current activities), FURS answered very 
generally without listing any specific activities, from which we conclude that the 
question was not formulated properly.
5. DISCUSSION 
Our empirical analysis has shown that the introduction of the voluntary tax com-
pliance instrument in the Republic of Slovenia was enacted on the basis of a pre-
viously implemented pilot project of horizontal monitoring and is founded on the 
experience of other countries (especially the Netherlands). The pilot testing of an 
idea or instrument is an excellent model of preliminary assessment of the effects 
of tax legislation, though in this case, unfortunately, inadequate for a more com-
prehensive analysis. The objective of our subsequent analysis was to determine 
to what extent the instrument fulfilled the expectations of the legislator or FURS 
in the sense of encouraging taxpayers to calculate and pay taxes properly and on 
time and to better utilise the available human, financial and material resources 
of the authority. The answers provided by the surveyed experts showed that the 
introduction of the institute fulfilled the expectations of FURS, while the effecti-
veness of the institute (better utilisation of resources) is impossible to assess for 
at least two essential reasons. The first is the fact that not enough time has passed 
since the institute was introduced, and the second reason is that no measurable 
criteria for such an assessment have been set. 
The successful implementation of such tax policies or related legislative mea-
sures that should ultimately ensure positive long-term outcomes and satisfy the 
public interest is possible only with a systemic approach by all stakeholders (cro-
ss-sectoral co-operation at all levels), a comprehensively formulated plan (mate-
rial and non-material resources, organisational and procedural changes, suitable 
legislation that is also adapted in other areas intertwined with this) and with the 
commitment of political decision-makers, who must make such measures, which 
promise long-term and diverse applications in many areas, a priority. A compari-
son of how this area is regulated in individual countries (the Netherlands, France, 
Croatia) reveals that they used comparable approaches, seeing that the criteria 
and administrative procedures for entry, the system of ensuring the credibility of 
taxpayers’ tax data (internal tax controls) and the principles and the objectives of 
procedures are extremely similar, with the exception of the French model, which 
stipulates verifying the accuracy of data indicated in tax returns for a period of 
three to nine months after the end of the tax period, while procedures in the other 
countries may include a period of several years (Čičin-Šain, 2016). Regardless of 
the minor differences in approach, the principle whereby taxpayers are not exclu-
ded from potential ex-post tax control by investigators despite having joined the 
special arrangement of voluntary tax compliance applies in all of the countries, 
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except Croatia. This may be one of the more important reasons why taxpayers do 
not opt for this mechanism in greater numbers. 
In regulating this extremely important area, all countries are considering ways to 
ensure protection of the public interest even though the very concept of public 
interest is often a highly intangible category and varies from country to country. 
This means that the need to introduce such mechanisms and their subsequent 
effects vary depending on country size, level of development, industry structure, 
company size, etc.
6. CONCLUSION
After analysing the main non-quantified objectives of FURS in introducing the 
status of voluntary tax compliance, we can make a general conclusion that the 
instrument fulfilled the expectations of the legislator or FURS. The respondents 
(experts) pointed out that the expectations (unofficial, we presume) regarding the 
number of taxpayers who would join were greater, but this is information that 
cannot be found in official documents or answers provided by FURS. Further-
more, no major shortcomings have been detected, whereby it needs to be pointed 
out (this was mentioned several times in the surveys) that not enough time has 
passed since the introduction of the instrument for a more thorough assessment. 
We were, unfortunately, unable to investigate what FURS’ current concrete acti-
vities are, except that five taxpayers closely co-operating with FURS acquired 
the status. In this article, we therefore did not focus on issues such as how many 
of these taxpayers already have internal tax controls in place and how many are 
still setting them up, what exactly these internal tax controls mean and what qu-
ality standards they must meet, etc. As regards the potential long-term effects of 
the introduction of the voluntary tax compliance institute and more transparent 
co-operation of certain taxpayers with FURS, our study found that from FURS’ 
perspective such co-operation with taxpayers would facilitate the allocation of 
the tax authority’s existing resources and a more thorough tax control of the most 
risky taxpayers.
Taking into account theoretical assumptions, it follows from all of the findings 
that although the instrument fulfilled the declarative expectations, its effective-
ness is difficult to clearly identify and evaluate. An additional problem is the ina-
dequate definition of quantified objectives at the introduction of the instrument, 
as well as of suitable indicators, which prevents making an economic analysis of 
the instrument and an evaluation of its effects in other areas. In any event, con-
sideration should be given to examining the economic efficiency and other aspe-
cts of this and all future instruments, as this would, on the one hand, reveal the 
potential long-term effects on public finances and, on the other hand, the effects 
on the organisation, management and planning of the tax authority’s operations.
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Prethodno priopćenje
Sažetak
Od 2015. godine pojedini porezni obveznici mogu podnijeti zahtjev za poseban 
status u cilju promicanja dobrovoljnog ispunjavanja obveza u Poreznoj upravi 
Republike Slovenije (FURS), nakon što je pilot projekt horizontalnog praćenja 
uspješno završen 2010. godine. Teorijska podloga takvog statusa leži u ideji ko-
operativne usklađenosti, koja se može opisati kao praćenje, predviđanje i sprje-
čavanje problema u odnosu poreznih vlasti i poreznih obveznika. Svrha ovog 
odjeljka je analizirati instrument koji bi trebao uspostaviti suradnju temeljenu na 
transparentnosti, razumijevanju i međusobnom povjerenju poreznih obveznika i 
poreznog tijela. Metodologija istraživanja usmjerena je na istraživanje među po-
reznim stručnjacima koji su sudjelovali u izradi nacrta zakona o provedbi odnosa 
suradnje kao i stručnjaka ovlaštenih za praćenje rada instituta. Glavni ciljevi 
studije bili su usredotočeni na identifikaciju trenutnih aktivnosti, procjenu oče-
kivanja, nedostatke, ograničenja i potencijalne promjene u identifikaciji instru-
menta i procjenu dugoročnih učinaka instituta.
Ključne riječi: dobrovoljno ispunjavanje poreznih obveza, porezni obveznik, po-
rezna uprava, kooperativni odnos
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